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Abstract
In a separate-property jurisdiction, marriage may induce do-
mestic cooperation, and enhance e¢ ciency in the production of
children, because it may lend credibility to the prospective main
earner￿ s promise to compensate the main childcarer when the
children will no longer be economically dependent on them. In a
community-property jurisdiction, marriage will induce domestic
cooperation, and enhance e¢ ciency in the production of children,
because it rules out strategic behaviour. Whatever the matrimo-
nial property regime, reducing the cost or di¢ culty of obtaining
a divorce will have no permanent e⁄ect on the divorce rate. In a
separate-property jurisdiction, it will encourage marriage, and in-
duce more married women to specialize in market work. Couples
should be allowed to choose the matrimonial property regime.
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11 Introduction
Marriage is losing ground to unmarried cohabitation throughout the de-
veloped world.1 In the US, by the start of the millennium, the ratio of
unmarried to married couples was 8 to 100, and 35 out of 100 births
occurred out of wedlock. Similar ￿gures apply to Western Europe (with
a peak, in Sweden, of 18 unmarried to 100 married couples, and 55
percent of children born out of wedlock). The trend was preceded by
changes in legislation and public attitudes. Cohabitation without mar-
riage has been socially acceptable, in Western societies, at least since
the 1960s, and the legislative trend is towards giving unmarried cou-
ples the same rights as married ones where tax treatment, inheritance,
adoption, housing tenure, recognition of partner as next of kin (e.g., in
case of hospitalization), and so on are concerned. Any residual form
of legal discrimination has disappeared, in most European countries,
with the introduction of legislation enabling unmarried couples to ac-
quire the same legal rights as married ones by simply recording their
union in a public register.2 The name given to these o¢ cially recog-
nized, non-marital unions varies from country to country (Eingetragene
Lebenspartnerschaft in Germany, civil partnership in the UK, pact civil
de solidaritØ in France, etc.), but the substance is the same. Two persons
can costlessly obtain the same legal bene￿ts as a married couple, without
surrendering the right to terminate their union at any moment and, gen-
erally, without any legal obligation to make compensatory transfers to
each other. That not withstanding, marriage remains the most popular
option among couples, especially when they decide to have children (in
many cases, marriage coincides with the birth of the ￿rst child). Why?
I do not underestimate the value of ritual, nor the weight of religion (in
some countries, and for certain confessions, a religious marriage counts
as a civilian marriage, and it is thus not possible to have the former
without the latter). But, is there also an economic argument?
A number of empirical economics papers, including Waite (1995),
Brown and Booth (1996), Manning and Lichter (1996), Bumpass and
Lu (2000), Manning et al. (2004), Kenney and McLanahan (2006), and
Bj￿rklund et al. (2010), reports that marriage makes a di⁄erence to
the domestic allocation of resources, and to the well-being of children.
Another body of empirical papers, including Zelder (1993), Gray (1998),
Clark (1999), Chiappori et al. (2002), Stevenson (2008), Gonzalez and
Viitanen (2009), and Bargain et al. (2010), reports that the introduction
1See, for example, Stevenson and Wolfers (2007).
2This possibility is open to both homosexual and heterosexual couples, but it is
not to be confused with homosexual marriage, which is in no way di⁄erent, for our
present purposes, from heterosexual marriage.
2of divorce on demand throughout the developed world in the course of
the 1980s had only a small and temporary e⁄ect on the divorce rate,
but permanently a⁄ected the marriage rate, and the participation rate
of married women. Until recently, however, the theoretical economics
literature has largely ignored the issue. Even Gary Becker￿ s seminal 1972
and 1974 articles, entitled "A theory of marriage", are actually not about
marriage at all, because they model couple formation and dissolution
under the assumption that the "spouses" can costlessly re-optimize every
time a new matching opportunity presents itself. As far as I am aware,
the ￿rst paper to address the role of the marriage institution is Mnookin
and Kornhauser (1979), which uses game-theoretical concepts to show
how being married conditions a couple￿ s private bargaining. The second
is Ch. 5 of Cigno (1991), where it is shown that divorce rules induce
some married couples to ine¢ ciently separate, and others to ine¢ ciently
stay together. Only recently has this de￿cit of theory started to be
￿lled by a wave of fresh contributions, including Fella et al. (2004),
Drewianka (2004 and 2006), Matoushek and Rasul (2008), Cigno (2009)
and Wickelgren (2009).
A popular explanation of the role of marriage is that, being di¢ cult
or costly to rescind, it constitutes a commitment to stay together for a
while, and will thus encourage e¢ ciency-enhancing, couple-speci￿c in-
vestments. A corollary of this explanation is that, the more di¢ cult or
costly it is to obtain a divorce, the greater will the commitment value
of marriage be. This does not appear to be borne out by fact however.
The introduction of divorce on demand made the marriage bond sub-
stantially looser. By eliminating the need to gather or fabricate evidence
of misdemeanour on the other spouse￿ s part, it also reduced the cost of
obtaining a divorce. Contrary to what many expected, however, this
legislative innovation caused only a modest and short-lived increase in
the divorce rate, which can be easily interpreted as a once-for-all mis-
match correction. Were it true that a reduction in the cost or di¢ culty
of obtaining a divorce leads to a reduction in the commitment value
of marriage, furthermore, American couples intent on making a success
of their marriage would have taken advantage of a subsequent legisla-
tive innovation of opposite sign (￿rst in Louisiana and then in other US
states), which allows a couple to opt for a form of marriage ("covenant
marriage") characterized by a substantially higher cost of divorce. This
forti￿ed form of divorce has had extremely few takers. In what follows,3
I shall argue that
(i) marriage may indeed serve as a commitment device, and thus
encourage couple-speci￿c investment, not because it makes it di¢ cult
3For a more technical exposition, see Cigno (2009), on which I draw.
3for the parties to go their di⁄erent ways, but because it empowers a
court of law to decide who should compensate whom in the event of
divorce, and
(ii) a reduction in the cost or di¢ culty of obtaining a divorce can
only raise the commitment value of marriage.
As the focus is on marriage, the analysis will start where the match-
ing process ends. Like much of the theoretical literature on the subject,
I shall restrict my attention to heterosexual couples, and assume that
the parties are perfectly informed not only about each other￿ s charac-
teristics, but also about the characteristics of all alternative partners (in
much of the exposition, I shall also assume that incomes are known with
certainty, but this only will a⁄ect a policy conclusion). That ignores
some important features of the real world, but will allow me to concen-
trate on fundamentals. Like most authors, I shall take it for granted that
the couple will not draw up a contract enforceable through an ordinary
court of law. That is not true in all cases, but it is not a bad assumption
from which to start. Even in a business context, some contracts are no
more than memoranda of agreement,4 and others are legally unenforce-
able because the parties explicitly wave their right to court adjudication
in case of dispute.5 The reason for this reluctance to enter into water-
tight contracts could be that the latter are not only expensive to draw
up, but also expensive to enforce (high cost of gathering evidence, large
court and lawyers fees), and that the outcome of litigation is not guar-
anteed in any case, because the courts have some degree of discretion.
In a family context, there is an additional deterrent to the formulation
of legally enforceable contracts, namely that the punctilious enumera-
tion, at the outset of a union, of each party￿ s possible misdeeds, and
of the attendant penalties, would likely kill even the most promising of
relationships stone dead.
In Becker (1972, 1974), already mentioned, the distribution of the
surplus generated by "marriage" is determined by the "marriage mar-
ket". In the game-theoretical literature on the subject, by contrast, the
distribution is the outcome of a two-person game. In the wake of Manser
and Brown (1980), and McElroy and Horney (1981), the assumption is
generally that the game will be cooperative. An exception is Lundberg
and Pollak (1994), where the partners behave non-cooperatively, but
the nature of the game is still taken as given. The choice of game is
endogenous in Del Boca and Flinn (2005), where it is taken to depend
on an exogenously given transactions-cost of cooperation. I allow for the
choice of game to depend on all the parameters of the model, including
4See Macaulay (1963)
5See Ryall and Sampson (2009).
4the couple￿ s initial endowments, and the legal environment. For simplic-
ity of exposition, I shall identify cooperation with Nash-bargaining, and
non-cooperation with playing Cournot-Nash. As both parties have right
of veto over the choice of game, the couple will play Nash-bargaining
only if (after any appropriate money transfer) neither party would be
better-o⁄ playing Cournot-Nash.
2 Fundamentals
The moment the couple is formed, each party is endowed with a certain
earning capacity ("human capital"), and a certain amount of conven-
tional assets ("money"). The latter may be the result of gifts, bequests
or personal savings, and can be further increased by saving in the course
of communal life. The former re￿ ects natural talent, past educational
investments, and learning by doing. From the moment the couple is
formed, however, human capital can be accumulated only by market
work. This generates increasing returns to market work. One may simi-
larly assume increasing returns to domestic work, but so long as there are
increasing returns to the other activity, that would only strengthen the
results. Both parties derive utility from a private good, consumption,
and a local public good, children. The latter have a "quantity" (num-
ber) and a "quality" (potential lifetime utility) dimension. Each child
absorbs a certain amount of speci￿cally maternal time in the peri-natal
period.6 Above that amount, paternal time is a substitute for maternal
time. For simplicity, I shall assume that it is a perfect substitute, but
nothing of substance changes if we assume that paternal time substi-
tutes for maternal time at a diminishing marginal rate. Child quality is
produced by means of "attention" (parental time above the minimum
that can only be provided by the mother) and money. The latter (hence,
anything money can buy, including the services of hired helpers) substi-
tutes for the former at a diminishing marginal rate. I shall assume that
fathers and mothers have the same preferences.
The time that the parties have left to live from the moment the couple
is formed can be divided into two phases. In the ￿rst one, the parties
can work, have children, and condition these children￿ s quality of life by
expending resources on them. In the second, the parties can still work,
but not a⁄ect the quality of any children that might have been born in
the previous phase, because those children are now become independent
adults. This segmentation of the time line is the most appropriate one
for my present purposes, but not for others. Were I concerned like Del
6This minimum includes the perinatal period, and a certain amount of time (as
short as three weeks, or as long as three years, according to school of pediatric
thought) after the child is born.
5Boca and Flinn (1995), with the e⁄ects of custodial arrangements on the
amount of support provided by the non-custodial parent I would end the
￿rst phase somewhat earlier, when the children are still dependent on
their parents. Were I concerned with the matching process like Peters
and Siow (2002), Chiappori et al. (2006) or Cigno (2007), I would let
the ￿rst phase end even earlier, when the couple is formed.
If the parties do not cooperate, the number of children is decided
by the woman, who has ultimate control over her own fertility. This
assumption is widely used in the economics of the family literature, but
the conclusion do not change in any substantive way if it is assumed
instead that both parties have power of veto. Each party has the option
of unilaterally withdrawing from the union if the couple is not married,
of petitioning a court for divorce if the couple is married. In real life,
many unions break down while the children are still dependent on their
parents, or even before the children are born. That, however, is a result
of imperfect information. In our perfect information world, it does not
make sense to sense for a person to form a union with a particular part-
ner when a better one is known to be available, or to have children and
then withdraw from the union while there is still scope for cooperatively
increasing the utility of these children. Separation may make sense only
in the second phase, when the children are grown-up and out of the way.
As is often done in the endogenous fertility literature, I shall treat leisure
as a constant. This simplifying assumption has some empirical justi￿-
cation. Burda et al. (2006) report that a person￿ s total (market plus
domestic) work time varies across countries (notably, between Europe
and the US), but not across households within the same country. What
varies across households is only the allocation of total work time between
market and domestic work. In the second phase of communal life, when
there are no more children to look after, both parents will work full time
for the market. Therefore, the way a person￿ s total work time is divided
between market and domestic work in the ￿rst phase determines that
person￿ s earnings not only in the ￿rst, but also in the second phase.
Let us now look at the properties of a Pareto-optimal optimal alloca-
tion of a couple￿ s joint resources. As a child￿ s quality and, consequently,
the utility of each parent depend on the amount of parental attention
that the child receives, but not on how much of this attention is provided
by each parent, the optimization can be carried out in two steps. First,
we ￿nd what share of any given amount of parental attention should be
provided by each parent in order to minimize the opportunity-cost of
this attention. Second, we look for the amount of money and attention
per child, and the quantity of children, that maximize a parent￿ s utility
for each possible level of the other￿ s. In the presence of credit mar-
6ket imperfections, this maximization will be subject to the constraint
that the couple cannot borrow more than the sum of the man￿ s and
the woman￿ s individual credit rations. If that constraint is binding, the
resulting allocation will be only a "local" Pareto optimum, because the
wider economy in which the household is immersed is not at an opti-
mum. That is the sense in which the expression "Pareto e¢ ciency" is
generally used in game theory.
The ￿rst step of the optimization is illustrated in Figure 1, where t0 is
the minimum amount of time that a woman must necessarily spend with
each child, t the total amount of attention (time in addition to t0) that
the parents give each child, tf the amount provided by the mother, and
tm that provided by the father. Given increasing returns to market work,
the isocosts are convex to the origin. For the perfect substitutability
assumption, the isocosts are straight lines with absolute slope equal to
unity. Therefore, it is e¢ cient for one parent to provide all of t. I shall
call this parent the main childcarer, and the other the main earner.7
Notice that, as the isocosts are not symmetrical around the 45￿ line,
because the origin of the axes is translated by t0, there is more than a
50/50 chance that the solution will be at the South-East corner, as in the
diagram, and that it will consequently be e¢ cient for the woman to be
the main childcarer. For the opposite to be the case, the woman￿ s human
capital endowment would have to be su¢ ciently larger than the man￿ s to
compensate for the fact that part of her time is necessarily absorbed by
the children. In other words, the man may have a comparative advantage
in market work even if his human capital endowment is no larger than
the woman￿ s. Nothing of substance changes if we assume that paternal
attention is not a perfect substitute for maternal attention, and the
isoquant is consequently convex to the origin. Provided it is not more
convex than the isocosts, there will still be some degree of specialization.
Given the cost-minimizing division of labour, and recalling that chil-
dren are a local public good, the e¢ cient quantity of children will equate
the sum of the costs for the parents to the bene￿t for each of them of
having an extra child. An e¢ cient allocation of the couple￿ s endowments
will equate the MRTS of parental attention for money in the production
of child quality to the minimized opportunity-cost of this attention, and
equalize his and her MRS of present for future consumption. The com-
mon value of this MRS will be equal to the interest factor if the couple￿ s
joint borrowing constraint is not binding, higher if it is. In the second
case, the allocation will only be a local Pareto-optimum. In Fig. 2, Uj
denotes the main childcarer￿ s, and Uj the main earner￿ s, utility. The con-
7In developed countries, where fertility is low, and life expectancy high, the main
childcarer has plenty of time left to engage in market work.
7  
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                                     Figure 1.  The cost-minimizing division of labour tinuous, concave-to-the-origin curve, symmetrical around the 45￿ line, is
the locus of the Pareto-optima.
In the next two sections, I shall look for the properties of the domes-
tic equilibrium, with and without marriage. Before doing that, however,
I must be a little more speci￿c about the relative size of the money en-
dowments with which the parties started their communal life (that is
irrelevant for the characterization of an e¢ cient allocation, which de-
pends only on the sum total). In some of his writings, Gary Becker
hypothesizes that couples are positively assorted, which may be taken
to mean that the parties to a union will have the same money and human
capital endowments. In other of his writings, he hypothesizes that the
criterion for getting together is complementarity of traits, which may be
taken to mean negative assortment (rich boy seeks talented girl, or vice
versa). Lam (1988) demonstrates the existence and stability of match-
ing equilibria characterized by either positive or negative assortment.
In the more recent literature, the assumption is generally that partners
are matched by income or wealth. In our context, however, if a person
enters into a partnership with another, his or her income and wealth
will depend on the domestic division of labour. As the latter depends,
in turn, on the human capital endowments of the two partners, we have
then a circular argument. Couples are matched by income or wealth,
but income and wealth depend on the match. The matter becomes even
more complicated if one allows, like Konrad and Lommerud (2000), Pe-
ters and Siow (2002) or Cigno (2007), for the possibility that young
people, or their parents, invest in human capital and conventional assets
with a view to in￿ uencing the outcome of the matching process. My
way out of the quagmire is to assume that men and women are matched
by their maximized utility in the best alternative to the present match
(singlehood, or a di⁄erent match). Then, either the parties to a union
will have the same endowments (positive assortment), or one will have a
larger human capital, and the other a larger money endowment (negative
assortment).
3 Games couples play
In a Cournot-Nash game, each party maximizes its own utility, subject
to its own budget and borrowing constraints, taking the other￿ s actions
as parameters. In the present context, the woman will choose how much
to work and save, the quantity of children, and how much of her own
time and money to contribute to these children￿ s upbringing, subject to
her individual budget and borrowing constraints, taking the man￿ s con-
tributions as given. The man will choose how much to work and save,
and his own time and money contributions to the children￿ s upbringing,
8subject to his individual budget and borrowing constraints, taking the
quantity of children, and the woman￿ s contributions, as given. In equi-
librium, the parties will equalize their earnings, consumption and utility.
But this utility, and the quality of the children, will be ine¢ ciently low.
In Fig. 2, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is represented by point C, on
the 45￿ line, but below the e¢ ciency locus. That should come as no
surprise. We know that Cournot-Nash equilibria are ine¢ cient. But let
us see in which way it is ine¢ cient in the present context.
If the parties have the same money, and the same human capital
endowment, they will split everything down the middle. The man and
the woman will work in the market for the same amount of time, spend
the same amount of time looking after their children (as t0 can only be
provided by the woman, this implies that the man will supply more than
half of t), and bear half the monetary cost of each child. Now, we know
that, if the parties have the same human capital endowment, it would be
e¢ cient for the woman to be the main childcarer. As this is not happen-
ing, it then follows that the parties are not exploiting their comparative
advantages. As the opportunity-cost of parental attention is not mini-
mized, children will be brought up with too little parental attention, and
relatively too much money. As a further consequence, the full marginal
cost (monetary plus opportunity-cost) of children will be ine¢ ciently
high. But this does not necessarily imply that the quantity of children
will be ine¢ ciently small. Given that the mother bears only half of the
cost of each child, there is in fact no way of telling, in general, whether
the quantity of children will be too large or too small. In other words,
the ine¢ ciency arising from the woman￿ s free-riding will be traded-o⁄
against the one arising from the misallocation of the couple￿ s time en-
dowments. If the parties have di⁄erent human capital (hence, money)
endowments, they will equalize earnings. As this implies that the party
with the larger human capital endowment does less market work than the
other, this is the same as saying that the parties specialize against their
comparative advantages. As private consumption will still be equalized,
this implies that the party with the larger money endowment will bear
the larger part of the monetary cost of the children. I have already re-
marked that it would make no sense for a couple to separate in the ￿rst
phase of communal life. If the couple plays Cournot-Nash, the parties
will be indi⁄erent between separating or staying together in second one,
because their utility will be the same either way.
What is there to stop a couple from agreeing to allocate their joint
resources in an e¢ cient way? We know that e¢ ciency requires division
of labour. Given that the main childcarer would earn less, in both phases
of communal life, than the main earner, neither party will want to be the
9former unless it receives adequate compensation from the latter. This
raises a problem. In the second phase, when the children will have grown
up, there will be no more e¢ ciency gains to be reaped through cooper-
ation, and it will then be in the main earner￿ s interest to renege on any
promise it may have made to the main childcarer in the ￿rst phase. In
the absence of a contract enforceable through an ordinary court of law,
any promise of future compensation the prospective main earner might
make will then lack credibility, and the prospective main childcarer will
agree to cooperate only if the compensation is paid at front. If the main
earner is not credit rationed, that will not distort choice. The main
earner will dissave or borrow to the point where its MRS of present for
future consumption is equal to the main childcarer￿ s. The Utility Pos-
sibility Frontier (UPF) of the Nash-bargaining game will then coincide
with the e¢ ciency locus. Suppose, however, that the main earner￿ s in-
dividual borrowing constraint becomes binding before the transfer has
reached the level required to buy the main childcarer￿ s cooperation. At
that point, the main earner￿ s MRS will become larger than the main
childcarer￿ s, the allocation will cease to be e¢ cient, and any further in-
crease in the size of the transfer will make the ine¢ ciency even larger.
The UPF will then fall below the e¢ ciency locus. In Fig. 2, the dashed,
concave-to-the-origin curve is the UPF if the main earner￿ s borrowing
constraint is binding for all positive values of the main childcarer￿ s util-
ity. This frontier is everywhere steeper than the e¢ ciency locus.
In many household economics applications of Nash-bargaining the-
ory, the coordinates of the threat-point are given by the outside options
of the two parties. In Lundberg and Pollak (1996), by contrast, the
threat-point is identi￿ed with the equilibrium of the Cournot-Nash game
that the couple could have plaid as an alternative to Nash-bargaining.
In general, this approach runs up against the objection that each party￿ s
money and human capital endowments will be irreversibly modi￿ed by
the couple￿ s time allocation decisions. Once the children are born, and
time is spent on them, there will be no way to reach the alternative
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and this equilibrium cannot then be the
threat-point of the Nash-bargaining game.8 The objection loses force,
however, if compensation is paid at front. In Fig. 2, the threat-point
of the Nash-bargaining game is then C. The rectangular hyperbolas
through points B and B￿are contours of the Nash-maximand. If the
main earner￿ s individual borrowing constraint is never binding in the
relevant range, the equilibrium is at point B, where the e¢ ciency locus
intersects the 45￿ line. Otherwise, it will be at point B￿ , inside the ef-
￿ciency locus, and above the 45￿ line. As the distortion caused by the
8This endogeneity problem is addressed in Basu (2006).
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Figure 2.  Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Nash-bargaining equilibrium without marriage, 
and with either separate-property or community-property marriage. main earner￿ s borrowing constraint increases with the size of the com-
pensation, the re-distribution will stop before full utility equalization
is achieved. If the main earner￿ s borrowing constraint is very tight, a
Nash-bargaining equilibrium may not exist (C may lie outside the UPF).
If that is the case, the couple will play Cournot-Nash. Recalling that a
woman can qualify for the main earner￿ s job only if her human capital
endowment is strictly larger (and, consequently, her money endowment
strictly smaller) than her partner￿ s, the main earner is more likely to be
credit rationed, and cooperation less likely to come about, if the main
earner is the woman (k = f), than if it is the man (k = m).
4 Games married couples play
Let us now bring in the marriage institution. A marital union di⁄ers
from a non-marital one in that it cannot be dissolved without court per-
mission. In the event of dissolution ("divorce"), the court will have to
split any assets the couple might hold in common in some way, and may
also order one party to make a ￿ ow of income payments ("alimony") to
the other. As it remains true that neither spouse can have an interest
in divorcing while the children are still small, any award the divorce
court might make in either party￿ s favour cannot then be construed as
child maintenance. As already pointed out, in reality, some couples
divorce while their children are still dependent on them, but this can-
not be explained within a perfect information framework.9 A couple
will marry if, after appropriate compensation, the married equilibrium
Pareto-dominates the unmarried one. If the former neither dominates
nor is dominated by the latter, the couple will spin a coin.
Recall that, without marriage, the main earner cannot credibly promise
to pay the main childcarer compensation in the future. Marriage may
change that if legislation and jurisprudence make it in the main earner￿ s
interest to honour its promise. Compared with the unmarried one, the
married equilibrium must satisfy two additional ("divorce-threat") con-
straints, namely that it must not be in either spouse￿ s interest to seek
divorce. Clearly, at most one of these constraints will be binding. If
the main childcarer￿ s is, that will relax the main earner￿ s borrowing
constraint. Whose divorce-threat constraint is binding depends on the
matrimonial property regime. In a separate-property regime, it depends
also on divorce policy. In some legal systems, the law prescribes how
any joint assets should be split, and who should get alimony. In other
systems, the divorce courts have some degree of discretion, which they
9For an economic analysis of the e⁄ects of child-support orders, see Del Boca and
Flinn (1995).
11typically exploit to compensate the economically weaker party. I will
consider only two possibilities. Either the courts do not award alimony
(remember that there are no young children to be supported), and split
any assets held in common down the middle, or they award alimony, and
split any assets held in common, in such a way that to the two former
spouses will have the same utility.
In a separate-property jurisdiction, any income or assets a spouse
generates or acquires in the course of married life are that spouse￿ s per-
sonal property. Without marriage, the main earner￿ s promise to com-
pensate the main childcarer at some future date not be credible. This
promise will become credible, however, if divorce policy is egalitarian, be-
cause it will then be in the main earner￿ s interest to honour his promise.
In that is the case, the distortion generated by the main childcarer￿ s
divorce-threat constraint will be traded-o⁄against the one generated by
the main earner￿ s borrowing constraint. In Fig. 2, the UPF of the Nash-
bargaining game plaid by a couple married in a separate-property juris-
diction is represented by the concave-to-the-origin, dot-and-dash curve.
At the North-West corner of this curve, where the divorce-threat con-
straint is most, and the borrowing constraint least stringent, the main
earner￿ s MRS is smaller than the main childcarer￿ s. Where the UPF
crosses the 45￿ line, the divorce-threat constraint is not binding, and
the main earner￿ s MRS is larger than the main childcarer￿ s. In between
these extremes, there is a point where the MRS is the same for both
spouses. At that point, the UPF coincides with the e¢ ciency locus. If
the couple would have cooperated even without marriage as in the illus-
trative example, the threat-point of the married Nash-bargaining game
is B￿ . The equilibrium is then at point BSP, inside the e¢ ciency locus
and above the 45￿ line, but closer to both than B￿is. It would be even
closer if, without marriage, the couple would have plaid Cournot-Nash,
and the threat-point of the married game were then C.
The lower is the cost of obtaining a divorce, the tighter is the main
childcarer￿ s divorce-threat constraint (at any point of the UPF), and
thus the closer to the 45￿ line, and to the e¢ ciency locus, will point
BSP be. Therefore, the lower is the cost of obtaining a divorce, the
greater are the chances that a married Nash-bargaining equilibrium will
exist. To see what this implies, take a cost of divorce so high that,
for a number of couples, neither divorce-threat constraint is binding,
and the married equilibrium coincides with the unmarried one. These
couples will marry with probability one half (will spin a coin). Now
consider a lower cost of divorce. More couples will marry, and play Nash-
bargaining, at this than at the higher cost. Some of these additional
married couples would have play Nash-bargaining anyway, but the rest
12would have plaid Cournot-Nash. A larger proportion of married couples
will then play Nash-bargaining at the lower than at the higher cost of
divorce. This has two interesting implications. The ￿rst is that, as
cooperation is good for e¢ ciency, and child quality is higher if parental
time is e¢ ciently allocated, a low cost of divorce is good for children.
The second is that, as the main earner￿ s borrowing constraint is more
likely to be binding if the main earner is the woman rather than if
the main earner is the man, a larger proportion of married women will
specialize in market work at the lower, than at the higher cost of divorce.
This explanation is consistent with recent evidence, in Bureau of Labor
(2004), Drago et al. (2004), and Stancanelli (2007) among others, that a
substantial minority of women (up to one in ￿ve) in developed countries
now earn more than their male partners.
In a community-property jurisdiction, any assets either party might
have at the date of marriage remain that party￿ s individual property, but
any income produced or assets acquired after that date are the couple￿ s
joint property. Furthermore, the couple has a joint credit ration, instead
of two individual ones as in separate-property marriage. The fact that
neither party can hold on to what it earns rules out the possibility of a
Cournot-Nash game. The couple can only play Nash-bargaining. The
fact that the only assets of which a party can individually dispose are
those it has at the time of marriage gives a bargaining advantage to
the spouse with the larger money endowment, rather than to the main
earner as in separate-property marriage. That advantage disappears if
the divorce courts are egalitarian, but not if the courts have a neutral
stance. The fact that the couple faces only a joint borrowing constraint
implies that, in the absence of an operative divorce threat, the parties
will have the same MRS of present for future consumption, and the
equilibrium will then be e¢ cient. If the presence of an operative divorce
threat, however, there will be no credit-induced distortion against which
to trade the one induced by this threat. It will then be in the interest
of the spouse with the larger money endowment to transfer enough of
its own assets to the other spouse for this source of distortion to dis-
appear. The argument can be illustrated with the help of Figure 2. If
money endowments are so re-distributed that neither spouse can credibly
threaten divorce, the married UPF coincides with the e¢ ciency locus.
If the unmarried Nash-bargaining game has an equilibrium as pictured,
the threat-point is B￿ , and the married equilibrium is BCP. Otherwise,
the threat-point will be C, and the married equilibrium will be at B. In
the second case, the equilibrium gives the same utility to both spouses.
In the ￿rst, it gives more to the main earner. In both cases, however, the
married equilibrium dominates the unmarried one, and it will thus be in
13the interest of the party with the larger money endowment to transfer
part of its money endowment to the other in return for marriage.
It should be clear from the foregoing argument that, in a community-
property jurisdiction, the married equilibrium is independent of the cost
of divorce, because neither spouse can ever have an interest in divorc-
ing. Zelder (1993) and Friedberg (1997) estimate that the introduction
of divorce on demand encouraged divorce in the US. Smith (1997) ￿nds
that it had no e⁄ect in the UK. A possible reason for these contradictory
results is that the two US studies, based on cross-state data, do not con-
trol for the matrimonial property regime, while the UK study is based on
variations over time in a single country, where the regime was the same
throughout the sample period. Controlling for the matrimonial property
regime, Gray (1998) does in fact ￿nd that this legislative innovation did
not encourage divorce in the US as the earlier studies suggested, but did
encourage married women to supply more labour in separate-property
states. Stevenson (2008), however, attributes the e⁄ect of the matrimo-
nial property regime to an omitted-variable problem. My argument that
a reduction in the cost of obtaining a divorce will lead to an increase
in married women￿ s labour supply in a separate-property jurisdiction,
but will have no e⁄ect in a community-property one, is consistent with
Gray￿ s ￿nding. The explanation Gray gives of it is, however, that the
introduction of divorce on demand induced married women to insure
against the risk of ￿nding themselves without male income support by
refusing to be the main childcarer. My explanation, by contrast, is that
the introduction of divorce on demand made it possible for better qual-
i￿ed wives to credibly promise to compensate their less well quali￿ed
husbands at some future date, and thus to induce the latter to accept
the main childcarer role.
Looking at Fig. 2, it is clear that a separate-property equilibrium
cannot be more e¢ cient, or more equitable, than a community-property
one. Under conditions of certainty, this carries the policy implication
that the government should o⁄er only the latter. But, suppose that
the main earner is engaged in a business activity, and thus at risk of
bankruptcy. It could then be in the common interest of both spouses
not to hold assets in their joint names. The couple will then marry if
separate-property marriage is available, stay unmarried if it is not. In
general, therefore, the couple should be allowed to choose the matrimo-
nial property regime. In countries where the couple is given that choice,
a sizeable minority opts for separate property.10
10That is true even of countries like Italy, where the choice is available, but com-
munity property carries certain ￿scal advantages.
145 Conclusion
The economic argument for marrying varies according to the matrimo-
nial property regime. In a separate-property jurisdiction, if the cost
of obtaining a divorce is su¢ ciently low, and provided that it is court
policy to equalize post-divorce utility across the former spouses, mar-
riage induces cooperation, and will thus allow the spouses to specialize
according to their comparative advantages, because it lends credibility
to the prospective main earner￿ s promise to compensate the prospective
main childcarer at some future date, when the children will be no longer
economically dependent on them. In a community-property jurisdic-
tion, marriage induces cooperation, and will thus allow the spouses to
specialize according to their comparative advantages anyway, because it
rules out strategic behaviour. Without cooperation, parents will raise
their children with the wrong mix of money own time (too little of the
latter, relatively too much of the former). Therefore, cooperation raises
the utility of both parents and children. Contrary to popular belief, a
reduction in the cost of obtaining a divorce would have no permanent
e⁄ect on the divorce rate. In a separate-property jurisdiction, it would
encourage marriage, and induce a larger proportion of married women
to specialize in market work. The legislator should allow the couple to
choose the matrimonial property regime.
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